Designing OT Networks to Contain Breaches, Not Pretend They Won’t Happen

Assuming perfect prevention is not a strategy.

This principle focuses on blast-radius reduction, a concept CISOs understand well.

Board-Level Risk Controls

• Segmentation and micro-segmentation

• Separation of duties

• Elimination of flat networks

• Restrictions on lateral movement

Executive Insight

Resilience is defined by how much damage an attacker can cause after initial access.

Final Thought: Resilience Is About Containment, Not Confidence

No CISO should assume their OT environment is uncompromised—only that compromise has not yet been detected. Segmentation and blast-radius reduction acknowledge this reality without accepting defeat.

Boards rarely ask whether a breach is possible; they ask how bad it will be. CISOs who design networks to fail safely provide credible answers when those questions come.

Comments

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